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1,N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETTIL YON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs. - Case No. 10897 
STA'11E ROAD COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant wnd Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for breach of contract 
by the defendant, State Road Commission, whereby said 
defendant failed to furnish a free and clear right-of-way 
before requiring plaintiff to commence construction 
thereon. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
BY LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted defendant's Motion to 
Di1:m1iss when~in it was alleged a:> the only grounds for 
the Motion that, 
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint failed to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted, and 
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(2) The court lacked jurisdiction ov<c>r the Stat~ 
Road Commission in that the defendant was acting in its 
governmental function and had not consented to be sued. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the final Order of thr 
Lower Court with instructions to determine its damages 
and a Judgment wherein its right to pursue this action 
is upheld as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court has previously ruled that in passing on 
a Motion to Dismiss, all of the facts alleged and set forth 
in the pleading attacked must be assumed to be true. 
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah -1:76, 206 P. 2d 153. 
Based on this rule, the facts to be considered are as 
follows: 
On or about January 22, 1963, Bettilyon Construction 
Company entered into a contract with the defendant by 
and through its Department of Highways, for the con-
struction of an elevated highway near 6th South Street 
in Salt Lake City, which said highway was designed to 
serve vehicular traffic leaving Interstate Highway 15 
and Interstate Highway 80, Salt Lake County, Utah 
known as Project No. I-IG-15-7(3-1:) Second Contract and 
Project No. I-15-7 (46) 306 Second Contract. 
The burden of furnishing the right-of-way to a con· 
tractor who is to build a highway for the State Road 
Commission of Utah is entirely and completely the obli· 
3 
gation and burden of defendant in that this contract by 
its own terms incorporated Paragraph 1-7.18 of the 
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construc-
tion of the State of Utah issued by defendant in 1960 
of which this Court may take judicial notice under the 
provisions of Section 78-25-1 UCA 1953. This paragraph 
provides: 
"The Director [of Highways J will be responsible 
for the securing of all necessary rights-of-way in 
advance of construction." (Emphasis added) 
Thereafter, on or about February 7, 1963, the 
EIMCO Corporation filed a Complaint in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County as Civil No. 141252, naming 
the plaintiff and the individual commissioners of defen-
dant herein as defendants, wherein it was requested that 
plaintiff be restrained from constructing said highway 
until such time as the nature and extent of the easement 
necessary to construct the aforesaid elevated highway 
could be determined and compensation be paid to the 
ElMGO Corporation for an alleged taking of its prop-
erty. 
As a result of the commencement of this action, title 
to the right-of-way necessary for the construction of said 
elevated highway was in dispute. 
Thereafter, plaintiff requested that defendant pro-
vide counsel or representation on its behalf to defend 
the action brought by the EIMCO Corporation. 
The defendant, State Road Commission of Utah, at 
no time agreed to furnish legal representation for plain-
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tiff in the aforesaid action, but refused to do so on the 
grounds that legal counsel might have a conflict of in-
terest. In fact, a conflict of interest did exist because 
defendant further informed plaintiff that it would be 
required to complete the aforesaid contraict according to 
its terms thereby subjecting itself to possible damages 
to the E,IMCO Corporation. 
As a result of defendant's refusal to furnish legal 
representation to plaintiff and further insistence that 
plaintiff go forward with the construction project before 
the dispute over the right-of-way had been resolved, 
plaintiff was required to obtain counsel to represent it 
in determining the issues raised by the EIMCO Corpor-
ation in the aforesaid action. In this connection, plaintiff 
incurred legal expenses in the amount of $2,144.00. 
Plaintiff has demanded payment from the State Road 
Commission for its necessary legal expenses incurred in 
the aforementioned action, but defendant has refused to 
pay the same suggesting that plaintiff should initiate 
legal action to enforce its claim. By contract plaintiff is 
also entitled to an additional reasonable attorneys' fee 
herein in connection with this action to enforce its rights 
against defendant's breach of contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BETTILYON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY HAS 
STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED. 
The parties hereto entered into a contract. The State 
Road Commission as a party thereto was required to 
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furnish to the plaintiff a right-of-way on which to com-
mence the work before that work could be commenced. 
At the time the plaintiff, as contractor, was required to 
commence construction, the extent of right-of-way avail-
able to it was in dispute. Plaintiff has alleged that the 
defendant, State Road Commission, refused to perform 
under the contract and that damages have resulted from 
this refusal. 
It seems clear that a claim upon which relief could 
' . be granted has been stated unless the defendant enJoys 
statutory immunity from suit or unless its requirement 
that plaintiff commence work on a disputed right-of-way 
as a matter of law did not constitute a breach of its 
contract with the plaintiff. These matters will be dis-
cussed in the next succeeding Points. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT, STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
HAS NO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN THIS 
ACTION. 
Section 27-12-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, provides : 
"By its name the Commission may sue, and it may 
be sued only on written contracts made by it olf" 
under its authority." (Emphasis added) 
Identical language as contained in Section 36-2-1 
Rev. St. 1933 was construed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Campbell Building Company v. State Road 
Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857. There a con-
tractor brought an action for damages arising out of 
breach of contract. Delay resulting from failure of the 
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State to provide a right-of-way was alleged. The defensr~ 
raised were grounded in governmental immunity and it 
was contended that the State of Utah was not liable on 
its contracts as would be an individual but was only 
responsible in specific performance. 
The Court, in a lengthy Opinion discussed the alle-
gations of the State's defense, and in applicable part 1 
stated: 
"The statutory prov1s10n is twofold. First, it 
waives immunity from suit by saying 'the com-
mission * * * may be sued,' and, second, a limi-
tation is imposed by the following language: 'only 
on written contracts made by it or under its au-
thority.' " ... 70 P. 2d 861 
The Court continued: 
"The contract in question is one made by the com-
mission under its authority. It is such a contract 
as mav be 'sued on' under the statute. The defen- 1 
dant ~ays that the right to sue the State Road 
Commission conferred by the statute 'only em-
braces suits in specific performance of the written ' 
contracts it has power to make and for funds 
payable under such contracts for road construction , 
only.' The statute, however, places no such re-
striction on the right to sue, but merely says the 
commission may be sued on its written contracts." 
... 70 P. 2d 861 
The question of the liability of the State for dam-
ages for failure to furnish right-of-way was resolved as 
follows: 
"The statutory provision must mean what the 
language naturally imports, that any suit on a 
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written contract which could be brought by the 
contractor against the other contracting party, 
if an individual, corporation, or municipality, 
might now he rnaintained under this authorization 
against the State Road Commission acting for the 
state, 29 C.J. 567." ... 70 P. 2d 861 
After citing several cases and discussing the princi-
pll' of sovereign immunity at length, the Court continued: 
"The cases hold, and that is the reasonable view 
to take, that where work is delayed by failure to 
provide right-of-way or by interference of the 
state engineer, causing extra expenses, such are 
matters of breach of contract, and whether or not 
negligence enters into the matter is of no mo-
ment." ... "When the contra.ctor is placed by act 
of the state in a position that it beoomes necessary 
for him to incitr the burden of extra work to com-
plete the job agreed upon, he is entitled to just 
compensation therefor." (Emphasis added) ... 
70 P. 2d 861 
'l'here is widespread support for the proposition that, 
where a state may be sued on its contracts, an action 
may be brought against it for damages for breach of 
contract. See 81 C.J.S., States, 125. 
The matter seems clearly settled m Utah where 
the State Road Commission enjoys no immunity for 
breach of its written contracts and an action may be 
brought against it for damages arising out of such a 
breach. 
POINT III 
FAILURE TO FURNISH RIGHT-OF-WAY HEREIN 
IS A BREACH OF CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
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The only other possible ground for granting the 
Motion to Dismiss below is that the State Road Com-
mission did not breach its \\Titten contract as a matter of 
law. While a state possibly might not be able to breach 
on implied contracts, the condition breached here is not 
implied, but express. Several courts have dealt with 
similar fact situations. The case of Derby Road Building 
Compa;ny v. Commonwealth Department of Highways, 
Ky., 317 S.W. 2d 891, involved a highway contractor's 
action against the State of Kentucky to recover for losses 
incurred because of delay in completing a contract proj-
ect because the utility lines had not been relocated. The . ' 
standard specifications of the State of Kentucky concern-
ing right-of-way read as follows: 
"The right-of-way for the highway will be obtained 
by the Department prior to issuing the 'Notice to 
Begin Work' ... " 
The Court said, 
"Even without this express provision of the con-
tract, it may be said that a contract for the con-
struction of a building or highway 'implies as 3Jl 
essential condition that a site shall be furnished 
upon which a structure may be erected." 
Citing 9 Am. J ur., Building and Coristruction Con-
tracts, Section 16 and Guerini Stone Company v. Carlin 
Construction Comparny, 248 U.S. 334, 39 Sup. Ct. 102, 63 
Law Ed. 275. The Court continued, 
"The implied condition or agrPemPnt as a pre-
requiste to the contractor to performing his part 
of the contract is not to be confused with 3Jl 
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implied contract, for a breach of which neither 
the State nor its agency in executing or perform-
ing a governmental function can be held liable in 
damages." 
Regarding :,;overeign immunity, the Court continued, 
"First we note the distinction that this is not an 
action in tort, but is an action for the breach of 
an express contract made by the State's Depart-
ment of Highways ... " 
The Court then cited the ca:,;e of Watkir1;s v. The 
Department of Highways, 290 S. W. 2d 28, for the propo-
sition that the plaintiff could have maintained a suit on 
its contract against the Department to enforce certain 
rights. Quoting from the latter case, the Court said, 
"Surely when the Department of Highways was 
authorized to enter into this contract, the Legis-
lature contemplated a binding agreement legally 
enforceable by both parties. A mutuality of obli-
gation was created. To deny appellants a right 
of action would be to destroy the sanctity of all 
contracts made by State Agencies and would 
seriously impair the operation of our Government. 
It may be said that the Legislature, in authorizing 
the Department to enter into a Contract, by neces-
sary implication authorized it to sue or be sued 
thereon." 
'l1he case of Wunderlich v. State Highway Commis-
sion., 183 Miss. 428, 184 So. 456, involved an action by a 
contractor against the State Highway Commission of 
Mississippi to recover the expenses paid by the contractor 
incurred in the construction by him of a highway for 
the Commission. Involved in this action were certain 
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damages resulting from an alleged failure to furnish 
right-of-way. The Court discussed at some length the 
obligation of the State regarding damages on its con-
tract with private parties and concluded: 
"No public policy there intervenes to excuse the 
State from its contract obligations and for the 
proximate consequences of its breach thereof; and , 
so we hope that, in such a case, the State is as a 
private contracting party, with the same rules of 
liability to be applied; and when, as here, the 
State creates an agency for the construction of 
buildings or roads or the like, and gives to that 
agency the dignity of a corporate body, authorizes 
it to make the particular construction contracts 
such as here in question; empowers it to supervise 
the execution thereon and to pay for the same 
out of funds supplied into the hands of said 
agency, and finally allows it, in broad and general 
terms, to sue and be sued, then that agency must 
stand in a suit by the contractor in all matters 
respecting the performance of its contract, and 
as to breaches of it during the course of such 
performance, as if the agency were a private party, 
and in accordance with the general contract ... " 
A subsequent appeal involving the same facts of 
the situation upheld the principle that the State Highway 
Commission is liable for a breach of contract to the 
principal contractor for the expenses incurred by the 
principal contractor as a result of a delay in procuring 
a right-of-way. See 10 So. 2d 453, Suggestion of Error 
Overruled 194, Miss. 119, 11 So. 2d 437. 
A case very similar to the one under consideration 
is Madison Cownty Construction Comparny v. State, 31 
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N.Y.S. 2d 883. In that case the contractor brought an 
action against the State of New York seeking reimburse-
ment for a judgment recovered against the construction 
company by landowners for trespass and for the costs 
and expenses incurred in def ending such action by land-
owners. The facts disclosed that in 1937 the contractor 
entered into a contract with the State of New York for' 
the construction of a highway. Later in the same month, 
it was notified to start work immediately on construc-
tion of the project. Work was begun and continued until 
its completion on November 5, 1938. On November 16 of 
1938 the highway was accepted by the State. In May of 
1938 an action was brought against the contractor to 
eject from the lands involved in the construction project 
and in 1939 a decision was rendered against the claimant 
aw?-rding the plaintiff nominal damages and eosts, hold-
ing that the contractor in performance of its work tres-
passed upon lands which had not been properly acquired 
by the State. 
The New York Court of Claims held that, 
"By failure to give to claimant the site of the 
work, the State breached the contract, thereby 
causing claimant to be delayed in the performance 
thereof and claimant is entitled to compensation 
therefor." llfansfield v. Ne1c Yark Central Rail-
road Company, 102 N.Y. 205, 6 N.E. 686, Sch'Ulflr 
nernimk Constniction Company v. State of New 
York, 116 Misc. 770, 189 N.Y. Supp. 567, Wright 
& Kremer:;, Inc., 1-. State of New York, 263 N.Y. 
615, 189 N.E. 724. 
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The Court continued, 
"Among the damages claimed were those for costs, 
legal fees, and disbursements incurred in defend-
ing the action in the Supreme Court. Ordinarily, 
costs and expenses in a prior action are not re-
coverable in a separate and subsequent action, 
but there are exceptions to such rule." 
The Court cited Cooper v. W eissblatt, 154 Misc. 522, 
277 N.Y.S. 709, 719 as follows: 
"There are also cases where a breach by the de-
fendant of a contract between him and the plain-
tiff has resulted in a judgment being obtained 
against the plaintiff in a prior action. In these 
cases the plaintiff has been permitted to recover 
of the defendant, in a subsequent action, the 
amount of damage awarded against him in the 
prior action, and also the legal expenses incurred 
by him in def ending that action, especially where 
the defendant has been requested to come in and 
defend. Carleton v. Lombard, 19 App. Div. 297, 
46 N.Y.S.120, affirmed 162 N.Y. 628, 57 N.E.1106; 
Dubois v. Hennancc, 56 N.Y. G73. The theory 
of such cases quoted seems to be that the defend-
ant must be deemed to have contemplated that the 
breach of his contract with the plaintiff might 
subject the latter to damages in an action by a 
third party, and therefore, he is deemed in law 
to have impliedly agreed to become responsible 
therefor ... " 
The Court also cited 25 C.J.S., Damages, Section 50 
(c), Page 534 as follows: 
"Where the natural and proximate consequence of 
a wr.ongful act has been to involve plaintiff in liti-
gation with others, there may, as a general rule, 
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he u reco,vcry in damages against the author of 
such act of the reasonable expenses incurred in 
such litigation, together with compensation for 
attorney's fees and such costs as may have been 
awarded aga,iust plaintiff; but such expenses must 
be the natural and proximate consequence of the 
injury comvlained of, and must have been incurred 
nece~sarily and in good faith, and the amount 
thereof must be reasonable." 
"Here, the State made a contract with the claim-
ant. Engineers for the State made plans for the 
construction of the highway and the State got 
the location of the road. Claimant was directed 
to proceed with its work on such location and in 
the action referred to was compelled to cease 
operations. It then had to def end itself in the 
absence of a defense on the part of the State so 
that the question could be decided as to whether 
the loca-tion of the highway was upon public or 
priva,te lands. It could not, of course, proceed with 
the work until that question had been determined. 
In the action, it was held that the location of the 
mad, as fixed by the State authorities and upon 
which location claimant was working, included 
lands which were not owned by the State, but by 
private parties. In effect, it means that the State, 
in staking out the highway, had led the claimant 
to believe that it was working on land acquired 
by the State which was not the fact. The leg,al 
expenses were not incurred in litigation between 
the parties, but in an action between a thirid party 
and the claimant, growing out of the unlawful acts 
of the State. Under these conditions and from the 
authorities cited, I am satisfied that claimant is 
entitled to recover f ram the State the damages 
oaused by the delay in the work ... " (Emphasis 
added) 
So in the present case, Bettilyon Construction was 
forced by the defendant to defend an action wherein the 
question was whether the proposed right-of-"\vay was pub-
lic or private properly. Plaintiff had no assurance that 
the right-of-way was clear. By failing to give plaintiff 
a clear work site, the Road Commission breached its con-
tract and caused the plaintiff to incur expenses of de-
fending the suit. Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for 
these expenses. 
CONC'LUSION 
The Judgment of Dismissal of the Lower Court is 
not in harmony with the law. It should be reversed with 
instructions to determine plaintiff's damages and to 
grant judgment therefor in accordance with the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
F. Burton Howard 
336 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
